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INTROdUCTION
A day after the military takeover of the 
Fiji government on 5 December 2006, 
Commodore Bainimarama proclaimed a 
nationwide state of emergency that gave 
wide-ranging powers to the military to enforce 
the new regime’s agenda. These repressive 
powers were entrenched in the Public 
Emergency Regulations (PER) imposed after 
the 10 April 2009 abrogation of the 1997 
Constitution. Early promises of elections by 
2009 were not kept; instead, successive 
decrees were promulgated to restrict human 
rights, suppress freedom of expression and 
clip the wings of the judiciary and indigenous 
Fijian institutions. They were aimed at stifling 
the capacity and will of the people to demand 
a return to democracy, and at entrenching 
the position of Bainimarama’s unelected 
government.1
The allocation of key government min-
istries and departments to military officers, 
and the winning over of specific indigenous 
communities by the provision of infrastructure 
projects have strengthened this position.
All of these actions, combined with a 
strategy of sidelining any political or military 
leader capable of replacing Bainimarama 
as PM or military commander, suggest that 
the post-April 2009 authoritarian military 
regime has become what Geddes terms a 
‘personalist’ regime, (in contrast to military 
or single-party regimes) even if this was not 
an original aim of the coup. In personalist 
regimes ‘access to office and the fruits of 
office depends much more on the discretion 
of an individual leader’ (Geddes 1999:121).
But, despite the high levels of repression, 
the fragility of Fiji’s economy poses a threat 
to the current government, adding to the 
threat imposed by those few still voicing 
opposition.
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EARLY SIGNS OF CONTROL
On 6 December 2006, one day after announc-
ing a military takeover of the government of 
Fiji — and after assuming the role of acting 
president — Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama, 
commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forc-
es (RFMF), stated in an address to the nation:
... it is with great reluctance that I, in the 
temporary capacity that I have assumed 
under the doctrine of necessity am 
proclaiming a state of emergency as 
provided for under section 187 of the 
Constitution (Bainimarama 2006).
In his address, Bainimarama justified 
his action by asserting that his regime was 
under threat of ‘disruption to peace and har-
mony’ by people who opposed the coup, or 
opposed his regime. 
Under the state of emergency, the military-
imposed government assumed extraordinary 
powers that enabled the disciplinary forces 
to arrest, question and detain people even 
without any complaints lodged against 
them, to control the movement of people by 
imposing curfews and roadblocks manned by 
police or armed soldiers, to enter and search 
premises, to control essential services and to 
control government activities. 
While that particular state of emergency 
was lifted in May 2007, emergency regulations 
were sporadically in place throughout 
Fiji — under the pretext of ‘threat from 
unstable elements’ —  until 10 April 2009, 
when they were replaced with the Public 
Emergency Regulations that have since 
been continuously imposed with heightened 
powers to suppress and control freedom of 
movement and expression.
The 2006 coup generated mixed reactions 
in Fiji and internationally. While there was 
opposition from the small but vocal group 
of citizens who had, since 1987, actively 
protested against coups and promoted the 
rule of law, democracy and equal rights, 
many professionals who had previously been 
steadfastly against coups, felt this one would 
be different and that Bainimarama would 
deliver, as he promised, beneficial reforms. 
Hopes for an early return to democracy were 
raised when, in January 2007, the presidency 
was returned to Ratu Josefa Iloilo, and again, 
eight months later, with the launch of the 
People’s Charter for Change and Progress. 
Hope was further encouraged by the fact that 
the National Council for Building a Better Fiji 
(NCBBF), launched on the same day, met 
regularly for more than a year to produce ‘the 
Charter’ — a key requirement of which was 
endorsement and implementation of its poli-
cies by an elected government. 
Nevertheless, opposition remained in 
some quarters — opposition that early threats 
by Bainimarama (such as his statement 
that ‘the Military will suppress very quickly 
any uprising against us’ (Bainimarama 2006) 
did not succeed in dispelling. Opposition 
included court cases against activities of the 
Bainimarama government as well as vocifer-
ous criticism in the media from rights-based 
non-government organisations (NGOs), trade 
unions, Fiji Law Society, leaders of political 
parties, and leaders of indigenous Fijian insti-
tutions and individuals.
From the outset, opponents were con-
cerned when, in the late afternoon of 
5 December, The Fiji Times reported that 
military personnel had moved into the news-
rooms of media outlets and directed that 
all news items would be screened by the 
military and that no negative comment about 
the commander or the takeover could be 
aired or published. That night, in response, 
Fiji TV cancelled its 10pm bulletin and The 
Fiji Times withheld publication of its edition 
of the following day. The responses seemed 
to have some effect; on 6 December, after 
a meeting with senior executives from four 
media companies and the chairman of the 
Fiji Media Council, Daryl Tarte, Acting Com-
mander Esala Teleni gave an undertaking 
that there would be no censorship and no 
further interference by the military in the role 
of the nation's media.
But, despite this assurance, meetings of 
political parties, such as the Soqosoqo Dua-
vata ni Lewenivanua (SDL), the Fiji Labour 
Party (FLP) and the National Federation Party 
(NFP), were required to be cancelled — and 
several union meetings were postponed until 
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it could be proven to authorities that ‘political’ 
issues were not on the agenda. Meetings of 
the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) were also 
banned after it rejected the president’s nomi-
nation of Ratu Epeli Nailatikau for the position 
of vice president.
In the weeks that followed the coup, the 
regime moved against senior civil servants, 
systematically removing, demoting, or 
sidelining those identified as supportive of the 
deposed Qarase government. The longest-
serving permanent secretary in the prime 
minister’s office was dismissed immediately 
after the takeover, and cabinet positions 
were reshuffled. But some civil servants 
lodged legal challenges, and the Airports Fiji 
Limited Workers Union, and the affiliates of 
the Confederation of Public Sector Unions 
— which includes the Fiji Public Service 
Association, the Fiji Nursing Association 
(FNA), the Fiji Teachers Union (FTU) and the 
Air Traffic Management Association of Fiji — 
threatened strike action over a looming five 
per cent pay cut. Affiliates of the Fiji Islands 
Council of Trade Unions (FICTU), including 
the Fijian Teachers Association (FTA) — 
the Public Employees Union, and the Viti 
National Union of Taukei Workers — also 
threatened strike action. 
As it turned out, the FNA went out on 
strike for 12 days in July, but their grievances 
remained unaddressed. The FTA stopped 
work on 2 August, but cancelled the strike 
within a day after realising that the govern-
ment wouldn’t meet their demands. 
However, not every protest could be 
quashed by the interim government; after 
many years, several compensation cases 
lodged after the 1987 and 2000 coups, were 
coming to a head. In September 2007, the High 
Court awarded university lecturer Dr Anirudh 
Singh FJD$790,000 compensation for being 
abducted and tortured by soldiers in 1990. 
On 12 August 2008, the High Court awarded 
Naitasiri farmer Taito Navualaba FJD$73,000 
compensation for his 2002 humiliation and 
torture at gunpoint by the military. In March 
2009, Senitiki Naqa, who was similarly 
tortured, was awarded FJD$65,000 by the 
High Court. And, pending, was an estimated 
half-a-million-dollar compensation lawsuit on 
behalf of the 34 politicians held hostage in the 
2000 coup. 
AbROGATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
ANd SUbSEqUENT dECREES
Any fear in the minds of Bainimarama and 
his collaborators of facing prosecution for 
their parts in the 2006 coup that might have 
been triggered by the spate of High Court 
findings related to the 1987 and 2000 coups, 
could only have been amplified by the 9 April 
2009 finding of the Fiji Court of Appeal. That 
court found that, contrary to the October 2008 
finding of the High Court, the president had 
not had the powers to dismiss the Qarase 
government in 2006 and that his actions 
had been invalid. The implications for the 
Bainimarama regime were immense, and 
its response proved the worst fears of many 
citizens in regards to how Bainimarama might 
react if pushed too hard.
That same evening, Bainimarama 
addressed the nation, appearing to accept the 
decision of the Court of Appeal by announc-
ing that Fiji effectively had no prime minister, 
no ministers and no government in place, 
and that the president would make a deci-
sion soon on the Court’s directive that he 
appoint a caretaker prime minister who was 
neither Qarase nor Bainimarama (Bainima-
rama, 2009). But the next day — Good Friday 
— radio stations carried the message that the 
constitution had been abrogated. 
The range of decrees that followed the 
announcement created a system of presi-
dential rule-by-decree that could not be chal-
lenged by any one, in any circumstances, 
in any court or tribunal. Five decrees were 
promulgated on Good Friday — many more 
were to follow.
Decrees Related to Control over Execu-
tive Authority, the Judiciary and Rights’ 
Advocates
Decree No. 1, the Fiji Constitution Amend-
ment Act 1997 Revocation Decree 2009, 
‘wholly removed, revoked, and abrogat-
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ed’ Fiji’s Constitution and declared that all 
decrees promulgated by the president were 
to be ‘regarded as law and shall be observed 
and enforced’. In announcing the decree to 
the nation, the 88-year-old President Ratu 
Josefa Iloilo stated, 
[T]o facilitate the holding of true dem-
ocratic and parliamentary election I 
hereby abrogate the 1997 Constitu-
tion ...  You will agree that this is the 
best way forward for our beloved Fiji  
(Iloilovatu Uluivuda 2009). 
Iloilo went on to state that a further period of 
five years was necessary to put in place the 
necessary electoral reforms and processes, 
and that he would direct the soon-to-be-
appointed ‘Interim Government’ to hold true 
democratic and parliamentary elections by 
September 2014 at the latest.
Iloilo then announced Decree No. 2, 
the Executive Authority of Fiji (Amendment) 
Decree 2009, under which he appointed 
himself President of Fiji, and thereby head 
of state, commander of the RFMF and head 
of any government appointed under that 
decree. The decree, promulgated on Friday, 
10 April 2009, states that ‘until a Parliament 
is elected in accordance to a Constitution 
yet to be adopted’, the president shall have 
powers to: (a) appoint a prime minister by 
decree; (b) appoint other ministers on the 
advice of the prime minister; (c) make laws 
by decree in accordance with the advice 
of the prime minister and cabinet; and (d) 
exercise the executive authority of Fiji. The 
decree specifies that ‘No question of the 
validity of this Decree or any other Decree 
shall be entertained by any Court of Law in 
Fiji’.
Power was becoming centred around the 
frail and aging president, the coup-leading 
prime minister backed by the military council, 
and the attorney-general, who would be 
responsible for churning out over a hundred 
more decrees during the next two and a half 
years.
Decree No. 3, the Fiji Existing Laws 
Decree 2009, declared that existing laws 
and decrees in force before 10 April 2009 — 
with the exception of the 1997 Constitution 
Amendment Act 1997 (in effect, the 1997 
constitution) — were to continue in force and 
be read with necessary modifications. 
Decree No. 4, the Revocation of Judicial 
Appointments Decree 2009, provided that 
any court of law, authority or office estab-
lished and any judicial appointment made 
under the provisions of the 1997 Constitu-
tion was to be dissolved, and appointees 
removed and posts declared vacant. The 
decree applied to the Supreme Court, Court 
of Appeal, High Court, Magistrates Court, 
and to all judges and magistrates, includ-
ing the master of the High Court. Under 
the decree, no officer whose appointment 
was terminated or removed was entitled to 
any monetary compensation, nor were they 
entitled to take any action for damages for 
dismissal in any court. 
The first four decrees effectively clipped 
the wings of the judiciary and prevented 
the use of the law to challenge the govern-
ment’s validity. The last of the five decrees 
announced on 10 April 2009 was Decree 
No. 5, Public Emergency Regulations 2009 
(PER). The decree assumes a state of emer-
gency exists in the country because elements 
planning activities to destabilise the govern-
ment may exist. It curtails key civil and politi-
cal rights, and is discussed later in this paper.
Attention then turned to further tightening 
loopholes in the decrees, further restricting 
‘independent’ institutions and restricting the 
powers and freedoms of people who utilise 
these institutions.
Decree No. 8, Office of the Vice-President 
and Succession Decree 2009, promulgated 
on 16 April 2009, authorises the president to 
appoint the vice president for a term of five 
years, and also provides that, if neither the 
president nor the vice president is able to 
perform the function of the president, then it 
may be performed by the chief justice or next 
most senior substantive judge. Prior to this, 
only a person nominated by the GCC could 
be appointed as president or vice president 
of Fiji. The day after Decree No. 8 was pro-
mulgated, Ratu Epeli Nailatikau — earlier 
rejected for the position by the GCC — was 
sworn in as vice president of Fiji to fill the 
vacancy that had been created when former 
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vice president Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi resigned 
in protest after the 2006 coup.
On 28 July, the Executive Authority of 
Fiji (Amendment) Decree 2009 (Decree No. 
28) was promulgated; it authorises the chief 
justice to appoint the president on the advice 
of the cabinet. Prior to this, only a vice presi-
dent who had been appointed after nomina-
tion by the GCC, could become president. 
The amendment further curtails the powers 
of the GCC and increases the chance of a 
commoner and non-indigenous person being 
appointed president. On the same day, Baini-
marama announced the retirement of Iloilo; 
the president was to go on leave on 30 July 
and not return to office. Vice President Naila-
tikau became the acting president and, on 
5 November, was appointed president of Fiji 
by Chief Justice Anthony Gates at a swear-
ing-in ceremony at Government House. 
The reason for the earlier decrees amend-
ing executive authority had finally become 
clear — they enabled the Bainimarama 
regime to appoint a president (and ministers) 
of its choice and so enabled continued presi-
dential rule-by-decree. 
Meanwhile, the dismissal of judicial offi-
cers in accordance with Decree No. 4 had 
created chaos, with all scheduled court cases 
being delayed for at least a month (Fijilive 
15/4/2009). On 16 April, the Administration 
of Justice Decree 2009 (Decree No. 9) was 
promulgated; it enabled re-establishment of 
the judiciary. Deemed as coming into force 
on 10 April, the decree gives power to the 
President to make all initial appointments to 
judicial office positions, including the posi-
tions of judges of various courts and magis-
trates. A section on ‘Transition’ reiterates the 
revocation of all judicial appointments made 
under the 1997 constitution, but provides for 
all proceedings in the Courts that had com-
menced prior to the abrogation, to continue. 
The decree also requires the termination of 
any proceeding that had commenced prior 
to the abrogation of the Constitution but that 
had not yet been determined, if it challenged: 
‘the validity or legality of any Promulgations, 
Decrees and Declarations made between 5 
December 2006 to 9 April 2009’; any deci-
sion of the president or any minister during 
that period; any decision by the ministry or 
Immigration Department to remove a person 
from Fiji during that period; any presidential 
or government decision to terminate any 
employment (whether in public office or not) 
between 5 December 2006 and 7 January 
2007; any decision made by the Judicial Ser-
vice Commission (JSC) between 7 January 
2007 and 9 April 2009; and, any government 
decision made between 5 December 2006 
and 9 April 2009, on the grounds of inconsis-
tency with the 1997 constitution.
By way of this decree, the government 
gained control of the judiciary, terminated all 
court actions launched against it, and pre-
vented the launch of any further court actions 
against its decrees or any other decisions, 
including civil servants’ employment issues.
The decree claims that all courts and 
judges ‘are independent of the executive 
branch of Government or any other author-
ity, in the exercise of its judicial functions’. 
Such ‘independence’, however, must be 
severely challenged by the fact that the 
decree requires the chief justice and the 
president of the Court of Appeal to be 
appointed by the president following consul-
tation with the prime minister and the attor-
ney-general; and the judges of the Supreme 
Court, the justices of appeal and the puisne 
judges of the High Court to be appointed by 
the president on the recommendation of the 
JSC following consultation by the JSC with 
the attorney-general. 
The JSC is itself compromised in that, 
under the decree, it consists of the chief 
justice (as chairperson); the president of 
the Court of Appeal; a legal practitioner 
appointed by the president on the advice of 
the attorney-general, and a person who is 
not a legal practitioner, also appointed by 
the president on the advice of the attorney-
general. The attorney-general is tasked with 
the appointment of all four members of the 
JSC. A quorum for the JSC is reduced to the 
chairperson and one other member. 
Under the decree, no court has the juris-
diction to accept, hear or determine any chal-
lenges to the Fiji Constitution Amendment Act 
1997 Revocation Decree 2009 or any other 
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decree. Furthermore, the courts do not have 
jurisdiction to hear any challenge on ‘the 
validity or legality of any Decrees made by 
the President from 10 April 2009’. 
Thus did the government curtail the pow-
ers of the judiciary and the ability of citizens 
to challenge in the courts any of its past or 
future actions.
A Law and Justice Report for the period 
April 2009 to April 2010 produced by the 
Citizens’ Constitutional Forum (CCF) notes 
that 40 judicial officers were dismissed on 
10 April 2009 but only eight reappointed 
(CCF 2010(a)). A former military lawyer was 
placed in both the Magistrates Court and the 
High Court, and, until June 2010, the chief 
registrar was Ana Rokomokoti, a military 
lawyer. The report also notes that, as of April 
2010, seven magistrates and three judges 
had been brought in from Sri Lanka. 
In July 2009, a magistrate was dismissed, 
allegedly over a dispute with the chief regis-
trar. In January 2010, three more magistrates 
were dismissed, allegedly for not supporting 
the Fiji Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (FICAC) proceedings. In early 
2010, the acting director of public prosecu-
tions, John Rabuku, was replaced by former 
military lawyer Aca Rayawa. With judicial offi-
cers facing termination at the apparent whim 
of the government, Fiji’s judiciary was coming 
under increasing strain. The appointment of 
military officers to the judiciary further height-
ened concern about its impartiality.
As if these restrictions on the judiciary were 
not enough, on 12 May, an amendment to the 
decree was promulgated — the Administra-
tion of Justice (Amendment) Decree (Decree 
No. 9) 2009). It was deemed to be in force 
from 10 April. This decree strengthened the 
prohibition against challenges to the decree 
abrogating the constitution, and to all other 
decrees, by providing for the termination of 
any such challenges. Importantly, under the 
amending decree, any proceeding, claim, 
dispute or grievance purporting ‘to challenge 
any decision made by the Government or 
the Public Service Commission between 5 
December 2006 and 9 April 2009 in relation 
to the terms and conditions of employment of 
public officers, including any changes to the 
remuneration of public officers, shall wholly 
terminate immediately’. 
By this decree, the government removed 
the possibility of legal recourse for public 
servants and their trade unions pertaining 
to public service terms and conditions. Soon 
after, a second amendment to the Admin-
istration of Justice Decree increased the 
powers of the chief registrar by providing that 
a certificate issued by a chief registrar or tri-
bunal for proceedings in a court or tribunal is 
conclusive of matters stated in the certificate, 
and the decision of either to issue a certificate 
cannot be challenged in any court or tribunal. 
This gave powers to the chief registrar or 
tribunal to terminate even court proceedings 
underway before a judge or magistrate, mak-
ing the chief registrar more powerful than the 
highest court in the land (CCF 2009). 
A third amendment to the Administration 
of Justice Decree tightened the screws on 
government employees yet further. Promul-
gated in February 2010, but in force retro-
spectively from 10 April 2009, it provides that 
‘all decisions of Government or any Govern-
ment entity relating to restructure, terms of 
conditions of employment or remuneration 
cannot be challenged’ (CCF 2009). 
After curtailing the powers of the judi-
ciary and public servants and their unions, 
the government turned its attention to other 
independent bodies who utilise the judiciary 
for fulfillment of rights. The Fiji Human Rights 
Commission (FHRC), with the independent 
powers bestowed upon it as a statutory body 
under the 1997 Constitution, had become a 
sore thumb for the government. Its director, 
Dr Shaista Shameem, had long been a vocal 
advocate against human rights violations, 
and had fought for justice for those who suf-
fered during the 2000 coup. 
Nevertheless, in January 2007, 
Dr Shameem controversially justified 
Bainimarama’s 2006 coup as an act 
of righting the wrongs that had occurred 
in the aftermath of the 2000 coup, when 
the lawful government of the then prime 
minister, Mahendra Chaudhry, was not 
returned to power — making all subsequent 
governments ‘unconstitutional’ (Shameem 
2007). Although appearing to be supportive 
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of the Bainimarama regime, Dr Shameem 
advocated retention of the 1997 constitution 
under any circumstances. The successful 
litigation of a few human rights violations 
cases by the FHRC was a reminder that the 
body had independent powers that could 
be used to litigate against the regime. Dr 
Shameem’s position was automatically 
terminated when the FHRC ceased to exist 
after the abrogation of the constitution. The 
FHRC was re-established with weakened 
powers under a new decree that turned it into 
a ‘toothless tiger’.
The Human Rights Commission Decree 
2009 (Decree No. 11), promulgated on 12 
May 2009, provides for the chairperson and 
two other members of the commission to 
be appointed by the president in consulta-
tion with the prime minister. Exercising a 
now-familiar technique to circumvent chal-
lenge, various sections of the decree prohibit 
the commission from receiving complaints 
against, or investigating, questioning or chal-
lenging, the legality or validity of the Fiji Con-
stitution Amendment Act 1997 Revocation 
Decree 2009, or such other decrees made 
or as may be made by the president. It also 
prohibits the FHRC from investigating (but 
not commenting on) any decision by a court 
of law; and from investigating any third party 
complaints against the 1997 Constitution 
Revocation Decree 2009, or other decrees 
made by the president. 
The lawyers were tackled next, with their 
ability to take court action against certain gov-
ernment activities being curtailed. The Legal 
Practitioners Decree (Decree No. 16), pro-
mulgated on 22 May 2009, diluted previously 
existing powers of the Fiji Law Society (FLS). 
Under the decree, the chief justice admits a 
person as a legal practitioner, while the Regis-
trar issues the certificate to practice — previ-
ously a responsibility of the FLS. Legal practi-
tioners have to reapply to the registrar for their 
certificate every year. The registrar also has 
the powers to cancel or suspend a certificate. 
The decree provides for the establishment of 
an Independent Legal Services Commission 
(ILSC), presided over by a commissioner 
appointed by the president on the advice of 
the attorney-general. The commission must 
act in accordance with ministerial guidelines, 
and has the power to order a fine or penalty 
not exceeding $500,000 for specified misde-
meanours by legal practitioners. While the 
commissioner and his/her employees cannot 
be taken to court, all orders made can be 
appealed. The chief registrar can receive and 
investigate complaints, investigate without 
complaints, commence disciplinary proceed-
ings against a legal practitioner or a law firm, 
obtain unresolved complaints from the FLS, 
and acquire associated information and docu-
ments through entering premises and other 
measures. Failure to comply with the decree 
can incur a penalty of up to $5,000 or up to 
five years’ imprisonment or both.
Many senior lawyers, including Dorsa-
mi Naidu, Hamendra Nagin, Akuila Naco, 
Haroon Ali Shah, Abhay Singh, Sheikh Hus-
sein Shah and Nilesh Lajendra, were tried 
for various misdemeanours by the ILSC, and 
received fines and penalties. The intimida-
tory force of the decree ‘worked’: vocal legal 
critics appear to have been ‘silenced’. After 
winning a case against FICAC in late 2010, 
lawyer Imrana Jalal, fearing persecution, 
resigned and relocated permanently to the 
Philippines; former FLS president Graham 
Leung, fearing persecution for his criticism of 
the regime in international conferences, had 
taken up employment overseas in late 2008; 
vocal critic of the regime Richard Naidu, who 
had been abducted and tortured prior to the 
events of April 2009, had, by that time, vis-
ibly quietened; and as a warning to other law 
firms contemplating anti-government cases, 
his employer, law firm Munro and Leys, was 
denied jobs by the government.
To further protect the post-2006 coup gov-
ernment — and further stifling the potential 
for citizens to challenge its actions — the 
Limitation of Liability for Prescribed Political 
Events Decree 2010 (Decree No. 18) was 
gazetted in April, giving unconditional immu-
nity to prescribed persons in relation to the 
events of 2000 and leading up to the abro-
gation of the constitution in April 2009. The 
decree covers the now-late president, Ratu 
Josefa Iloilo, Commodore Voreqe Bainimara-
ma, former caretaker prime minister, the now-
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late Jona Senilagakali, anyone who acted 
under persons covered under the decree, 
and members of the military, police and Fiji 
Prisons Service. Immunity does not extend 
to those already found guilty by a court or 
tribunal. Under the decree, no compensation 
shall be payable by the state to any person in 
respect of any claim, damage or injury arising 
from any prescribed political event for which 
immunity has been granted to the persons 
covered. In justifying the decree, Attorney-
General Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum referred to 
similar immunities established following the 
1987 and the 2000 coups.
Of even greater concern to civil society was 
a new criminal code, comprising the Criminal 
Procedure (Amendment) Decree, the Crimes 
(Amendment) Decree and the Sentencing 
and Penalties Decree, which came into effect 
on 1 February 2010. Alarmingly, under a 
broad interpretation of the code, harsh criti-
cism of the government could be defined as 
seditious or inciteful behaviour, and provide 
an excuse for the government to prosecute 
civil society members and individuals. 
Under the new Crimes Decree, the 
penalty for treason resulting in the death 
or imprisonment of the prime minister or 
president, or acts that collude with an armed 
invasion or war, is imprisonment for life. 
But the penalty for a person who commits 
treason but can justify that they were 
acting in ‘good faith’ or that their action was 
necessary, is less than 15 years; in some 
cases the person could go free. And while 
the penalty for mutiny has been reduced 
to 15 years’ imprisonment, the penalty for 
minor misdemeanours has been increased 
to up to five years’ imprisonment. Failure to 
report knowledge of treason can incur life 
imprisonment, and offences that are seditious 
can incur up to seven years’ imprisonment. 
Urging overturning the constitution or 
overthrowing the government can incur a 
sentence of up to 15 years’ imprisonment.
Not surprisingly, these penalties, com-
bined with media censorship, resulted in a 
dramatic drop in public criticism of the gov-
ernment by 2010.
The reduction of penalties for coups and 
treasons committed in ‘good faith’ was greet-
ed with apprehension by NGOs and anti-
coup advocates. The CCF opined that it could 
lead to greater acceptance of these crimes, 
do nothing to help end the cycle of coups, 
and ran counter to the recommendations on 
‘Ending the Coup Culture’ included in the 
People’s Charter (CCF 2010(b)).
The reason for the changed provisions 
relating to overthrow of a government and 
treason would appear to be twofold: firstly, 
they could be used to facilitate conviction of 
anyone planning to overthrow or incite action 
against the Bainimarama government; and, 
secondly, they could be used to protect — on 
the grounds of ‘good faith’ — those involved 
in the Bainimarama coup, were they ever to 
face court.
The Crimes Decree and the associated 
elements of the new criminal code had been 
foreshadowed by FICAC, established by the 
Bainimarama regime in April 2007 as part of 
the post-coup ‘Clean Up Campaign’. (A Pre-
vention of Bribery Decree was promulgated 
at the same time.) The reach of FICAC was 
expanded when, in 2010, the new Criminal 
Procedure Decree expanded its powers to 
allow it to commence and litigate any criminal 
charges.
The legitimacy of FICAC had earlier been 
questioned by the Fiji Law Society President, 
at that time Devanesh Sharma, and by law-
yers such as Graham Leung. On 31 May 
2007, Fijivillage.com reported well-known 
Suva lawyer Mehboob Raza describing 
FICAC’s prosecuting powers as ‘draconian’. 
By July 2007, FICAC already had a track 
record of revealing and sensationalising alle-
gations of corruption prior to the completion of 
investigations or prosecution. In comparison, 
the police and the Office of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions had been successful in 
prosecuting corruption-related cases — sug-
gesting that the establishment of FICAC was 
an unnecessary duplication, undertaken to 
prove the existence of the alleged corruption 
in government prior to the military takeover.
While some FICAC cases appeared 
genuine, others seemed more a case of try- 
ing to create charges against a particular 
person. Ratu SakiusaTuisolia, for example, 
former Airports Fiji Limited (AFL) chief 
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executive and formerly a member of staff in 
prime minister Qarase’s office, was charged in 
February 2008 with abuse and false pretense 
for allegedly using the AFL’s credit card to 
purchase $30,000 worth of personal items 
and other items during overseas trips (The 
Fiji Times Online (hereafter TFOL) 12/2/08). 
After more than two and a half years, the trial 
commenced in the High Court; a month later, 
Tuisolia was acquitted (TFOL 2/11/10). 
In the period between being charged and 
being cleared of this offence, in December 
2009, other charges were laid by FICAC in 
the Magistrate’s Court against Tuisolia and 
his wife, human rights lawyer Imrana Jalal. 
These related to operating a restaurant with-
out a license and providing false information 
to a civil servant — an offence normally 
dealt with by the Suva City Council fining 
the offender FJD$20. The inappropriateness 
of the case, which had no element of cor-
ruption, being taken on by FICAC prompted 
Jalal to vigorously defend against the charg-
es. FICAC expanded the charges and moved 
the case to the High Court. In July 2010, 
amidst huge international publicity surround-
ing the case, the High Court granted a stay 
order on six of the charges against Tuisolia 
and Jalal, noting that the time period under 
which a case relating to non-payment of fine 
can be started had lapsed long before the 
case had been instigated (TFOL 20/7/10). 
Later that month, the High Court granted 
a permanent stay on a remaining charge 
against Jalal and only one charge remained 
against Tuisolia (Fijivillage.com 30/7/10). 
Although a stay on the charges was granted, 
it appears the battle was too demanding for 
Jalal, who moved to the Philippines, where 
she was joined by her husband following his 
acquittal in November.
The Public Emergency Regulations
The eight-page PER was the last of five 
decrees promulgated by the president on the 
day the 1997 constitution was abrogated. 
The PER and the 2010 Media Decree were 
aimed specifically at stifling the voices of anti-
regime critics and isolating opponents of the 
government.
At the 8th Asia-Pacific Institute for Broad-
casting Development conference in Nadi 
in July 2009, Commodore Bainimarama 
explained that the PER was necessary for 
the government to achieve a truly united Fiji, 
with sustainable development, where corrupt 
practices and poverty were negligible, and 
where opportunities were equally available to 
the different ethnic groups (Lasaqa 21/7/09). 
He said that the PER was a temporary 
measure to provide a stable socio-political 
platform conducive for implementing nation-
building initiatives.
Under the PER, the police and local district 
officers have wide-ranging powers. They can 
prohibit absolutely or place conditions on 
‘any procession, meeting or assembly in any 
place, or building whether public or private’ 
unless a permit has been granted. Even 
if a permit has been granted, authorities, 
including members of the armed forces, 
have the power, after giving due warning, to 
disperse such a gathering, if in their ‘opinion 
such action is necessary for public safety’; 
they may use necessary force, including 
arms. Organising a gathering contrary to 
the provisions of the PER, and inciting 
someone to be part of such a gathering, 
are offences. Any police officer or member 
of the armed forces can enter any non-
residential building to ascertain that the law 
regarding meetings is being observed. The 
PER gives authorities power to regulate or 
close off any road, street, path or waterway 
or any public place, and to impose curfews 
in any area. It empowers them to control 
the movement of people who are deemed 
likely to provoke a breach of the peace, and 
to prevent entry and exit of persons from 
anywhere in Fiji. It has extensive provisions 
to regulate use of firearms, restrict the use of 
loudspeakers, and detain or search persons 
entering ‘protected places and areas’. A 
person suspected of acting, or being about 
to act, to breach public safety or peace, can 
be detained for 24 hours, and for a further 
48 hours if authority has been received from 
a police officer or magistrate. A police officer 
or magistrate can direct such persons to be 
detained for a further seven days.
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Under the PER, the president can sus-
pend the use or sale of uniforms, and those 
wearing uniforms of disciplined forces unlaw-
fully are regarded as committing an offence. 
The regulation allows armed forces person-
nel to perform the duties of a prison officer or 
police officer. 
The PER empowers the permanent secre-
tary for information to prohibit the broadcast 
or publication of such material that may give 
rise to disorder causing undue demands on 
the disciplined forces, or which ‘may result 
in breach of peace or promote disaffection or 
public alarm or undermine the Government 
and State of Fiji’. All broadcasters and pub-
lishers must submit all material for broadcast 
or publication to the permanent secretary; 
failure to comply with this provision could 
result in orders to cease all activities and 
operations. A person violating the PER can 
be fined $1000 and/or imprisoned for two 
years.
All existing permits for public meetings 
and gatherings were revoked when the con-
stitution was abrogated. Some organisations 
working in the areas of democracy and 
human rights faced additional restrictions. 
The CCF, for example, had to apply for 
permits to conduct its one-day educational 
workshops on human rights, good gover-
nance and citizenship, and for its two-day 
Grassroots Budgetary Workshops. To receive 
the permit, the CCF also had to remove the 
words ‘democracy’ and ‘constitution’ from its 
slogan, and remove the module on Fiji’s 1997 
constitution from its workshops.2
Despite holding a permit, the National 
Farmers Union was prevented from hold-
ing its AGM by the police as they felt ‘it was 
not safe for people to gather in big numbers 
as anything could happen’ (Fijivillage.com 
17/5/09). The permit given to the Fiji Insti-
tute of Accountants (FIA) 37th Congress 
was cancelled a day before the congress, 
but restored a few hours later by the com-
missioner of police after the first session 
had been cut from the proceedings (TFOL 
11/6/09). That session had featured a talk by 
Professor Brij Lal on ‘Fiji and the international 
community’ and a talk by Graham Leung on 
‘An experiment in nation building’. 
The permit for Fiji Law Society’s 2009 
AGM was cancelled by authorities with-
out reason (Fijivillage.com 6/9/09). Even 
the Fiji Rugby Union was forced to cancel 
a meeting in October 2009 after its per-
mit application was declined and its offi-
cials were threatened with incarceration if 
the meeting went ahead (Fijivillage.com 
24/10/09). 
More than a year later, the National Com-
mand Centre cancelled a permit granted to 
the NGO ‘Coalition on Human Rights’, for a 
march to commemorate International Human 
Rights Day. The permit was cancelled for 
‘security reasons’. The permit granted to the 
Transport Workers Union for the meeting of 
Pacific Sun union members of 23 December 
2010, was cancelled on the day of the meet-
ing (TFOL 24/12/10). 
The first two people arrested and detained 
under the PER were Fiji One Television jour-
nalist Edwin Nand and President of the Fiji 
Law Society Dorsami Naidu (Fijivillage.com 
15/4/09). Nand spent two nights in jail, and 
Naidu one night; both were released without 
charges on 15 April. 
A month later, the former Methodist Church 
of Fiji president, Reverend Manasa Lasaro, 
was arrested in relation to politically related 
statements by the church, and the then church 
president Reverend Ame Tugaue awaited 
questioning (Fijivillage.com 14/5/09). Rever-
end Lasaro had actively supported the 1987 
coup and was a known supporter of SDL, 
as well as a vocal critic of the Bainimarama 
government. A subsequent meeting between 
Bainimarama, Tugaue and the General Sec-
retary of the Methodist Church, Reverend Tui-
kilakilaWaqairatu, failed to resolve the issue 
after Bainimarama’s request to the church to 
reconsider their stand on the government and 
remove politics and instigators from within 
the church was refused (TFOL 4/6/09). A few 
weeks later, on 23 July, Rewa province High 
Chief Ro TeimumuKepa, appeared in the 
Suva Magistrates Court, together with Rever-
end Waqairatu and Rev Tugaue, on charges 
relating to breach of the PER. 
Probably the most bizarre use of the PER 
by the government was against its vocal critic 
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and known supporter of the SDL, Fiji Rugby 
Union chairman Viliame Gavoka. Gavoka was 
detained by police for 24 hours for spreading 
destabilising rumours and emails about a 
prophesy that an earthquake would strike Fiji. 
He was released on 22 October 2010, a day 
before the date predicted for the earthquake, 
together with Pastor Laione Lutumaimuri 
Nacevamaca, who had also predicted that 
an earthquake and tsunami would strike Fiji 
and cause major damage (Fiji Broadcasting 
Corporation (hereafter FBC)  22/6/10). The 
two were re-arrested after the prophesy did 
not eventuate and have been appearing in 
court under the Public Order Act on charges 
of allegedly making false statements that fos-
tered public alarm and public anxiety (Fijivil-
lage.com 15/7/10). Interestingly, the charges 
against Gavoka were dropped in June 2011, 
following the marriage of his daughter, Ela 
Gavoka, to Attorney General Aiyaz Sayed-
Khaiyum in March 2011 
The PER is being broadly interpreted in 
order to allow control over other areas of 
life. In September 2010, it was reported that 
state authorities had invoked provisions of 
the PER to restrict unnecessary use of water 
in the drought-afflicted Western Division. The 
police, it was reported, would monitor water 
use and decide how to deal with people found 
wasting it (Fijivillage.com 17/9/10). 
In effect, the PER has provided the gov-
ernment with the means of stifling the free 
expression of people in secure gatherings. 
It has prevented those opposed to any poli-
cies or actions of the government from con-
veying their criticism to the general public. 
Few statements critical of the government 
are seen in the media. Politicians, lawyers, 
the media, NGOs, academics, unionists and 
members of the public have all been effec-
tively silenced by the PER, which has been 
repeatedly extended for 30 consecutive days 
since 10 April 2009; it was extended for the 
twentieth time in November 2010, and exten-
sions have continued in 2011. 
The government had promised to lift the 
PER after a decree related to the media came 
into force; the Media Industry Development 
Decree was promulgated on 25 June 2010 
— but the PER remained in force. In his New 
Year’s message, Bainimarama announced 
that the PER would cease on Saturday, 
7 January 2012 (Fijivillage.com 2/1/12). 
Although the PER was lifted, a new Public 
Order Decree 2012 was imposed under which 
all restrictions imposed under the PER have 
been retained and the powers of arresting 
and detaining people were increased. The 
only restriction not carried forward from the 
PER was media censorship
Media Industry Decrees 
The government’s apparent fear of the media 
and its subsequent need to control it has 
been attributed to the events of 2000, when 
a hate-campaign against the then Prime 
Minister, Mahendra Chaudhry, by The Fiji 
Times led to inflammation of anti-Indian 
sentiments among ethno-nationalist Fijians, 
culminating in the volatile iTaukei march of 
19 May 2000, and the civilian takeover of the 
Chaudhry government. 
Fear that the events of 2000 could be 
repeated is likely to have weighed heavily in 
the government’s determination to control the 
media. After the abrogation of the constitu-
tion, the government began sending police 
officers to newsrooms. All stories critical of the 
government, military or the current status-quo 
were ordered to be removed. In May 2009, 
Fijilive reporters Dionesia Turagabeci and 
Shelvin Chand were arrested and detained in 
relation to a news item covering CCF criticism 
of the government for releasing eight soldiers 
and a policeman convicted of manslaughter, 
only two months into a sentence of four years 
and four months (Radio New Zealand Interna-
tional (hereafter RNZI) 10/5/09).
But control of the media extended beyond 
the newsrooms and news organisations. The 
Regulation of National Spectrum Decree 
2009 was promulgated on 13 November. By 
this decree, all power to issue or revoke the 
licenses for telecommunications, radio and 
television broadcasters, was vested in the 
minister responsible for communications — 
the Attorney-General Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum. 
All existing licences were made temporary 
pending a review by Khaiyum. There was no 
compensation for licensees whose licenses 
were cancelled, and the attorney-general’s 
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decision could not be challenged in any court, 
tribunal, judicial or adjudicating body. Breach-
es of the provisions could incur a fine of up to 
$100,000 or up to five years’ imprisonment.
The June 2010 Media Industry 
Development Decree 2010 provides for 
the establishment of the Media Industry 
Development Authority of Fiji to encourage, 
promote and facilitate the development of 
media organisations and services in Fiji, make 
recommendations relating to the media to the 
minister, ensure high standards; ensure that 
no media content is against public or national 
interest, promote local content; and refer 
complaints to the media tribunal established 
under the decree. 
To ensure authors can be identified, every 
article of 50 words or more must have a byline, 
and a breach of the decree can result in a fine 
of up to $100,000 for a media organisation, 
and up to $25,000 and/or a two-year jail term 
for a publisher or editor. The authority can 
investigate and require persons to produce 
a document or information, or explain why 
it can’t be produced. A breach can incur a 
fine of $10,000 or two years’ imprisonment. 
Destroying or falsifying documents, providing 
false or misleading information and obstructing 
officers, can also incur a $10,000 fine or two 
years’ imprisonment. 
Furthermore, positions of power in media 
organisations must be held by citizens 
permanently residing in Fiji, and 90 per 
cent of beneficial ownership must accrue 
to such citizens. This section of the decree 
forced the sale of The Fiji Times — a wholly 
foreign-owned subsidiary company of Rupert 
Murdoch’s News Limited, which had been 
critical of the government since the 2006 
coup — to the local Motibhai Group. 
The media tribunal has authority to inves-
tigate any media organisation. Media organi-
sations contravening orders of the tribunal 
— members of which are appointed by the 
president and the attorney-general — can 
incur fines of $100,000. Failure to print cor-
recting statements incurs a $10,000 (person) 
or a $100,000 (company) fine or two years’ 
imprisonment. There are numerous other 
fines for other infringements.
Duplicating the PER, under the media 
decree, the minister may prohibit broad-
cast or publication, ‘If information can give 
rise to disorder, cause undue demand on 
security agencies, breach peace, promote 
disaffection or public alarm, or undermine 
the Government and State of Fiji’. Media 
organisations must submit all material to the 
minister or cease activities and operations. 
Any other offence under this decree incurs 
fine of $10,000 or two years’ imprisonment. 
The validity of the decree and of decisions by 
the minister cannot be challenged, and only 
a fine of more than $50,000 can be appealed 
in court.
In effect, the Media Decree has forced 
the media to engage in self-censorship. As a 
result, citizens, especially those living in rural 
areas of Fiji and with limited communications 
technology, have access only to govern-
ment-approved stories in the newspapers, 
or on radio or television. The government 
further spreads its propaganda by publishing 
a roughly 20-page supplement in Saturday’s 
Fiji Sun every week, and by broadcasting 
twice on a Mai TV daily news programme, 
Fiji Today, which is produced by the Ministry 
of Information.
Inevitably, numerous blogs, such as 
Matavavalu, Solivakasama, Coup 4.5, Loyal 
Fijian, Solivakasama Worldwide Movement 
for Democracy in Fiji, and Raw Fiji News, 
have emerged to air the views of Fijians who, 
under the current repressive laws, cannot 
express themselves in the news media. 
These blogs tend to carry ‘hate speech’ 
and derogatory comments, and much of the 
‘news’ cannot be verified. However, the blogs 
have become very attractive alternative news 
sites in news-starved Fiji. 
The joint impact of the PER and Media 
Decree has been to block criticism of the 
government and make it possible for the 
regime to implement its agenda without 
having to deal with criticism and calls for 
transparency and accountability. The decrees 
also aim to prevent people from relaying 
messages in order to create alliances against 
the regime. 
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CONTROLLING INdIGENOUS 
FIJIAN INSTITUTIONS
One of the main justifications given by Baini-
marama for the coup was the need to pro-
mote equality and end racial discrimination. 
After April 2009, the government embarked 
on a systematic reform of all indigenous 
Fijian institutions (since the promulgation of 
the Fijian Affairs (Amendment) Decree 2010, 
the term Fijian (meaning indigenous Fijian) 
has been changed to iTaukei).
Under Decree No. 8, the privilege of the 
GCC to appoint the president or vice presi-
dent was done away with. Subsequently, the 
Fijians Trust Fund (Amendment) (No. 2) 
Decree 2009, which dilutes the power of the 
GCC by removing the need for the minister 
for indigenous affairs to consult with it when 
appointing the chairperson of the Fijians 
Trust Fund, was promulgated.
Under the Native Lands Trust Act (Amend-
ment) Decree 2009 the Minister, rather than, 
as was the case before, the GCC, appoints 
the five indigenous members to the Native 
Lands Trust Board (NLTB). The Native Lands 
Trust (Amendment) Decree 2010 makes fur-
ther substantial changes to decision-making 
with regards to land. It makes the minister for 
indigenous affairs the chairman of the NLTB, 
and gives the minister, rather than the presi-
dent, the power to set aside land as native 
reserve and to appoint members. Under this 
decree, Bainimarama, being the minister for 
indigenous affairs,  now has the authority to 
decide who takes part in deliberations on 
native land and what happens to native land. 
The underground Fiji Democracy and 
Freedom Movement, on the blog ‘Indigenous 
Peoples Issues’, pointed out on 7 July 2010 
that, amongst other things, the amendment 
removes a major reason for the continued 
existence of the GCC.
The Land Use Decree 2010 ensures that 
leases are for a minimum of 99 years, and 
gives the prime minister the authority to des-
ignate the lands of native landowners to the 
Land Use Unit. The aim of the decree is ‘to 
utilize designated native lands in a manner 
that is in the best interest of native land own-
ers and to utilize designated crown land with 
a view of achieving optimal returns for the 
state’. In a clause that is tediously repeated in 
the growing list of decrees, no court, tribunal, 
commission or any other adjudicating body 
can hear any challenge to the validity of the 
decree, to the decisions of any minister or 
state authority, or to the conditions of leases 
or validity of cancellation of leases, licenses 
or other instruments.
A former president of Fiji’s Tourism 
Resource Owners Association, Ratu Osea 
Gavidi, expressed concern that the land bank 
could alienate people from their own resource 
and remove their freedom to decide on how 
their land could be used (RNZI 10/8/10).
Early in 2011, the government announced 
income from leased land would, in future, be 
distributed equally among all mataqali mem-
bers, with no chief or titleholder receiving 
larger shares. 
SUPPORT bASES FOR THE COUP
The government’s control over the civil and 
political rights of the people of Fiji, particu-
larly since the abrogation of the constitution 
has, due to the new legal restrictions on the 
media, judiciary, lawyers, and indigenous 
Fijian institutions, been overpowering. The 
suppression of the rights of the people to 
meet and express political opinions, and to 
challenge government decisions has caused 
discontent amongst some sections of Fiji’s 
society. However, there are many who have 
publicly supported the coup. These include 
loyalist soldiers, some academics, politicians, 
some civil society advocates and, of late, 
those indigenous Fijian communities ben-
efiting from local infrastructure projects. The 
2006 coup has divided public opinion in 
Fiji, with a large section of Fiji’s community 
opposing it, and another large section either 
fully supporting it or willing to give the coup 
regime the same benefits of the doubt as 
those extended to an elected government. 
While the opposition’s voice has been effec-
tively suppressed through repressive laws, 
the supporters’ views are actively aired in the 
public arenas.
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The Military
After the 2006 coup, the Bainimarama regime 
retained civilians in many key ministerial 
and senior government portfolios. However, 
after April 2009, a systematic militarisation 
of the government took place; this ran paral-
lel with the PER and the numerous decrees 
as both a means of maintaining control over 
the public service and influential agencies, 
and a means of rewarding and retaining the 
support of military officers. Loyalist military 
officers were given promotions, whereas dis-
senting soldiers were penalised, persecuted 
and sidelined.
Despite Commodore Bainimarama’s 
early statements that there would be no 
army officers in any new interim government 
and that ‘no military officer should and will 
benefit from the interim administration’, by 
November 2010, CCF’s Reverend Akuila 
Yabaki noted:
To date it is known that 67 per cent 
of Fiji’s government ministries have 
military personnel in senior positions, 
where senior is defined as the Minister, 
or head of unit with second in charge 
decision making authority below the 
Minister; 32 serving military person-
nel have been appointed to the cabinet 
and civil service; 16 military appoint-
ments have been made to Statutory 
Boards and Government or Quasi 
Government Institutions; and 55 per 
cent of the national budget is under 
the authority of a military minister. This 
represents known appointments only, 
however, given that military titles are 
no longer being used in the govern-
ment gazettes, the actual extent of mili-
tarization of the government and civil 
service may be greater ... Of the total 
21 Ministries, only eight currently have 
no known military presence in a senior 
decision making capacity. The sanc-
tions imposed by Australia and New 
Zealand on civilians taking up positions 
within the current government have no 
doubt contributed to the high number of 
military appointments.
Bainimarama has gone one step further 
by allocating all the key ministerial portfolios 
to himself and the Attorney-General Aiyaz 
Sayed-Khaiyum; all the repressive decrees 
now fall under the portfolios of either 
Bainimarama or Aiyaz. 
Bainimarama, serving commander of the 
RFMF, has been the interim prime minister 
since January 2007 and, prime minister since 
10 April 2009. Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, a former 
military commander was appointed president 
in November 2009. Captain Timoci Natuva 
is the minister for public utilities, works and 
transport. Colonel Samuela Saumatua is 
the minister for local government, urban 
development, housing and environment. 
Former military officer Netani Sukanaivalu 
is the minister for lands and mineral 
resources. Former military commander Ratu 
Epeli Ganilau was the minister for defence, 
national security and immigration, but he 
resigned from all ministerial positions while 
he was acting PM in November 2010. As 
of February 2011, there are three military 
ministers in the government. Five permanent 
secretary (PS) positions are held by military 
officers: Lieutenant Colonel Pio Tikoduadua 
(prime minister’s office); Lieutenant Colonel 
Mason Smith (Department of Agriculture); 
Commander Viliame Naupoto (fisheries and 
forests); and Lieutenant Colonel Manasa 
Vanigi (provincial development, multi-
ethnic affairs and sugar). In August 2011, 
Commander of the Navy Francis Kean, 
who was also head of government shipping 
services, became acting permanent secretary 
for the Ministry of Works, Transport and Public 
Utilities, and was confirmed as permanent 
secretary in October. Kean, Bainimarama’s 
brother-in-law, had recently served time in 
gaol for manslaughter. The deputy permanent 
secretaries of the Fijian Affairs Board, and 
for provincial development are also military 
officers. The four divisional commissioner 
positions are held by military officers. Even 
Fiji’s national sport — rugby — was not spared 
from military control. On 7 May 2011, Fijilive 
reported that Colonel Mosese Tikoitoga had 
been appointed chairman of the Fiji Rugby 
Union board.
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In 2007, Deputy Commander EsalaTeleni 
was promoted to the rank of commodore 
and headed the Anti-Corruption Unit, before 
becoming deputy commissioner of FICAC. 
Later, in September 2007, he was appointed 
police commissioner, and, in late 2010, he 
was made ambassador to China. After the 
coup, Lieutenant Colonel Neumi Leweni 
was appointed permanent secretary for 
information, then, in 2010, he was made 
permanent secretary for lands; however, he 
was recalled to the army barracks at the end 
of 2010. Commander Viliame Naupoto was 
made the director of immigration but was 
later replaced by Major Nemani Vuniwaqa. 
Colonel Timoci Natuva was made minister for 
transport after the 2009 abrogation. Lieutenant 
Colonel George Langman was appointed 
deputy commissioner of FICAC in 2007. After 
the resignation of Teleni from the position 
of police commissioner in August 2010, he 
was replaced by Brigadier General Iowane 
Naivalurua, who retained the position of 
commissioner of prisons (FBC 17/9/10). Major 
Ana Rokomokoti was sworn in as a magistrate 
in May 2007, and in April 2009, appointed 
chief registrar; however, in June 2010, it was 
reported that she had been recalled to the 
army barracks (TFOL 26/6/10). The director 
of fisheries, director of government ITC 
services, director of foreign affairs, director 
of government pharmaceuticals, assistant 
director for disaster management centre, 
director of national planning, and the head 
of the film and television unit at the Ministry 
of Information are all military officers. Former 
military officer Isikeli Mataitoga is Fiji’s 
ambassador to Brussels. 
Land Force Commander Brigadier-
General Pita Driti had been a key public 
figure, speaking on behalf of the RFMF in 
the media on many occasions, defending the 
military’s actions and warned those criticising 
the government’s actions of reprisals. Another 
influential person in the RFMF was the 
commanding officer of the Third Fiji Infantry 
Regiment Lieutenant Colonel Roko Tevita 
Uluilakeba Mara. Both Driti and Mara had 
been anonymously identified by some people 
who had been abused at the military barracks, 
as giving the orders for the rounding up, ill-
treatment or intimidation at the army camp, 
of critics of the Bainimarama government 
after the December 2006 takeover. After 
wild speculations on anti-government blogs 
that they had been suspended from the 
RFMF for allegedly planning to assassinate 
Bainimarama, it was finally revealed by 
Bainimarama in October 2010, that they 
were not suspended, but on leave as they 
had accumulated substantial leave over the 
years. All officers were subsequently ordered 
to use up their leave and not accumulate 
it, as had been the practice in the past 
(FBC 25/10/10). Bainimarama revealed that 
Lieutenant Colonel Mara had accumulated 10 
months of leave. On 4 May 2011, however, 
Driti and Mara appeared in court charged 
with uttering seditious comments; Driti was 
also charged with inciting mutiny (Fijilive 
4/5/11). An amusing twist occurred when 
Mara escaped to Tonga two weeks later, 
claiming he was picked up by a Tongan patrol 
boat when he ran into difficulties during a 
fishing trip (Radio Australia 20/5/2011).
Another key public figure for the RFMF 
was Brigadier Mohammed Aziz, who is the 
military lawyer and has also acted as deputy 
army commander. In January 2011, Briga-
dier Aziz resigned from his positions on 
the Boards of Fijian Holdings Limited and 
Merchant Finance. No reason was provided 
to Fiji’s censored media, however, unofficial 
sources cited Brigadier Aziz’s attempts to 
gain personal benefit from these positions as 
a reason for his resignation. 
These actions, the recall to barracks of 
army officers Leweni and Rokomokoti, and 
the reshuffling of civil service and military 
portfolios held by soldiers, suggest that 
Bainimarama and his advisors may be wary 
of soldiers becoming too powerful, and so 
posing a challenge to Bainimarama’s rule. 
Such actions resonate with the literature on 
‘personalist’ military regimes: ‘If they choose, 
personalist leaders can select low skilled 
individuals who are less likely to unseat 
them … Personalist dictators also ensure 
that no individuals get too powerful through 
frequent rotations and purges’ (Frantz & 
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Ezrow 2011, Ch. 2). The relationship between 
Bainimarama and Attorney-General Aiyaz-
Khaiyum has thus been sustained, as 
Khaiyum does not enjoy the support of 
the military council or the major political 
parties. Khaiyum had also not been received 
with affection at an earlier Pacific leaders 
meeting. With no support base, he poses no 
threat to Bainimarama’s power.
Over the years since the coup, lower rank 
soldiers have been given roles in non-military 
agencies, such as assisting the Public Works 
Department with road building and repair 
work, managing natural disaster mitigation 
and relief works, and assisting the Land 
Transport Authority. They have also been 
working with the police to apprehend escaped 
prisoners and, since the coup, vehicles with 
the signage ‘Military Police’ have emerged. 
Soldiers accompany Bainimarama on his 
official trips to the interior, such as Namosi, 
Tailevu and Ra. In such ways, soldiers are 
made to feel they have an important role in 
Fiji’s society that is normally beyond that of 
the military and ordinary citizens. 
To implement the coup and to maintain 
the morale and loyalty of soldiers, between 
2005 and 2009 the government increased 
its expenditure on the military by FJD$25.3 
million. Government statistics reveal that 
expenditure on general public services by 
the Bainimarama government generally 
decreased after the coup (except in 2009), 
while expenditure on defence, public order 
and safety increased. The military drastically 
overspent its 2007 budget. Former finance 
minister Mahendra Chaudhry admitted that 
the RFMF did so without following proper 
procedures. Chaudhry, however, justified the 
overspending on the grounds that ‘following 
threats of overseas invasion after the 
December 2006 takeover, safety and security 
measures were put in place by the military 
which required more money then what was 
in their budgetary allocation’ (FBC 26/11/08). 
Fiji government’s yearly budgets show 
about 77 per cent of the government’s 
expenditure is utilised to maintain the public 
service machinery, and about one-tenth of 
this is on the military. The large size of 
Fiji’s military is a concern as, not only is 
it a potential threat to the nation’s political 
stability, but, more importantly, it also chews 
up a major portion of Fiji’s budget — money 
that the country desperately needs for 
infrastructure and anti-poverty projects. The 
higher un-budgeted expenditure each year on 
the military has been analysed by economists 
such as Wadan Narsey. There is serious 
concern amongst civil society that there may 
have been shifts in expenditure to military-
driven projects that remain invisible due to 
the fact that government expenditure cannot 
be monitored because no auditor-general’s 
report has been tabled since the 2006 coup, 
and due to the non-existence of a parliament. 
Geddes has noted that, among many things 
highly valued by professional soldiers are 
budgets sufficient to attract high-quality 
recruits and buy state-of-the-art weapons, and 
that the ‘... continued existence of lucrative 
opportunities for officers may depend on 
the survival of the military as an effective 
organisation’ (Geddes 1999:126). On this 
basis, retaining substantive expenditure on 
the military has been essential to the survival 
of Bainimarama’s coup regime.
Impact of Infrastructure and Poverty 
Reduction Strategies
One of the main aims of the Bainimarama-led 
coup in 2006 was the alleviation of poverty 
through infrastructure projects, the ending 
of racism and the eradication of corruption; 
these goals have become more significant as 
the centrality of others, including upholding 
the Constitution and electoral reform, seem 
to have diminished. 
After December 2006, many civil society 
supporters of the government, such as Father 
Kevin Barr and academic Satendra Nandan, 
were convinced that the government would 
resolve the squatter problem, provide mini-
mum wages and provide infrastructure, such 
as roads, water and electricity in rural areas. 
Their conviction was strengthened when, 
immediately after the coup, Interim Finance 
Minister Chaudhry announced that the 
increase in VAT to 15 per cent announced by 
the deposed government would be rescinded 
in order to reduce the burden on the poor. 
Projects were announced to build low-cost 
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housing, and complete major road works, 
such as the Kings highway. 
The need for economic improvement was 
made clear in Fiji: The State of the Nation 
and the Economy Report, a comprehensive 
report on Fiji’s economic situation since 
independence produced by the Secretariat 
of the NCBBF to assist in the formulation 
of a ‘charter’ for Fiji, which stated (NCBBF 
2008:9) that increasing government debt 
and associated high interest payments had 
drained funds for necessary infrastructure. 
The report revealed that Fiji’s economic 
growth had been on a slow downward curve 
since 1970. 
In Fiji, infrastructure development since 
independence has relied heavily on aid and 
development loans. The Rewa Bridge in 
Suva, for example, was made possible by a 
FJD$24 million aid grant from the European 
Union and, in 2005, the Asian Development 
Bank, World Bank and the Exim Bank of 
Japan co-funded road improvement projects 
worth FJD$118 million. 
Since the 2006 coup, the sources of 
aid have shifted as traditional lenders have 
demonstrated reluctance to support the 
non-democratically elected government, 
and funds have been sought and received 
from lenders less concerned with what they 
regard as internal politics. For example, in 
2010, China donated FJD$10 million for the 
implementation of the Somosomo Hydro 
Scheme, which will see the electrification of 
the island of Taveuni completed (Radio Fiji 
5/9/10). An FJD$80 million upgrade of the 
Sigatoka to Rakiraki Road, funded by the 
Exim Bank of Malaysia, is expected to be 
completed in 2011 (FBC 11/8/10).
If comments by provincial leaders are 
anything to go by, Bainimarama’s strategy 
of obtaining local community acceptance 
of his government through the delivery 
of local infrastructure may be working. In 
September 2010, a delegation of chiefs from 
16 districts of Naitasiri Province — a province 
known to be opposed to Bainimarama’s 
coup — visited Bainimarama’s residence in 
Muanikau to present a traditional apology for 
past indiscretions and to pledge support to 
the current prime minister and government 
(Fijivillage.com 3/9/10). The traditional 
presentation of a tabua (whale’s tooth) for a 
matanigasau ceremony to seek forgiveness, 
was made on behalf of its high chief, the 
Qaranivalu Ratu InokeTakiveikata, who 
is currently serving a prison sentence for 
attempting to assassinate Bainimarama, and 
on behalf of the province. The delegation 
included Ratu Inoke’s wife, Adi Lagamu 
Takiveikata. 
Speaking on behalf of the vanua of Vuda, 
Ratu Tevita Momoedonu said they were 
indebted for the infrastructure development 
in Ba Province that eventuated during 
Bainimarama’s term in office (FBC 4/9/10).
The people of Tovata Confederacy, in 
September 2010, expressed support for 
Bainimarama’s efforts to make development, 
and not elections, a priority (FBC 
5/9/10). In August 2010, similar sentiments 
were relayed by the people of Bua, 
Cakaudrove and Macuata in Vanua Levu. 
Speaking on behalf of Lau people, the Turaga 
Tui Ono Waisea Davuiqalita from Ono-i-Lau 
Island expressed satisfaction that Fiji was 
back on track, that promises by government 
had been fulfilled and that projects that had 
Province 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General Public Services 99,047 147,782 65,738 65,711 99,649
Defence 72,933 93,625 121,731 85,431 98,243
Public Order and Safety 84,129 96,558 99,977 108,541 108,093
Table 1:  Expenditure on Defence and Public Safety: 2005–2009 (FJD$ ’000)
Source: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, Key Statistics, June 2010.
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been in the pipeline for four years were 
completed (Radio Fiji 18/8/10).
Interestingly, Bainimarama’s apparent 
strategy of providing local infrastructure and 
services in exchange for support seem to be 
directed at the indigenous Fijian community. 
There is little evidence to show that the 
Bainimarama government is doing anything 
similar for communities of other ethnic groups. 
Notwithstanding these local examples of 
what could be seen as infrastructure-bought 
political acceptance, the overall economy of 
Fiji has not improved since the 2006 coup. An 
analysis of the government’s financial aims 
in the 2011 budget, undertaken by econo-
mist Dr Wadan Narsey, revealed that the 
Bainimarama government has failed to: raise 
investment levels to 25 per cent of GDP, grow 
the economy by 5 per cent annually, reduce 
the rate of poverty to a negligible level, and 
maintain average annual inflation to around 
2–3 per cent — all of which were put forward 
as aims of the regime following the coup 
(Narsey 2010).
The analysis reveals that, on the contrary, 
fiscal deficits and government debt, have both 
drastically increased since December 2006. 
CONCLUdING COMMENTS
On 6 June 2011, the attorney-general was 
reported on Fijilive as saying ‘We have 
brought in about 70 new laws within one 
year’. The previous month, on 11 May 2011, 
the solicitor general had been quoted on 
Radio Fiji as saying ‘Fiji passed 55 laws last 
year — and more will be passed this year ...’.
In the early period after the abrogation of 
the constitution, decrees were systematically 
announced, gazetted and published on the 
government website immediately upon prom-
ulgation. But within a few months, the public 
was learning only about those decrees that 
the government chose to announce in the 
media. Not all decrees were announced upon 
promulgation and some were not announced 
at all. In late 2009, the government stopped 
publishing decrees on its website. As a result, 
many people in Fiji could not access informa-
tion on significant changes in the law, and the 
reports in the media were their only source 
of information. However, in mid-2011, the 
government uploaded all the decrees onto 
its website, although many citizens remain 
unaware of this development.
Certainly, the Bainimarama regime has 
neither been democratic nor transparent in 
law-making. However, the promulgation of 
over a hundred decrees since the 2006 
coup suggests the coup was implemented 
in a markedly different manner to previous 
coups. The minor changes in legislation 
entrenched executive control over decision-
making. Some new pieces of legislation, 
such as the Crimes Decree, anti-corruption 
decrees, Media Decree and PER, have sig-
nificantly changed the legal scenario in Fiji 
as they enabled the Bainimarama regime to 
entrench repression. However, the regime 
also created support for its agenda through 
some ‘good governance’ laws, such as those 
focusing on anti-corruption, criminalisation of 
domestic violence, the neutralising of chiefly 
control, decriminalisation of homosexual rela-
tionships, and anti-racism. There have been 
mixed reactions amongst people, with many 
opposed to repressive laws but still managing 
some praise for the regime’s ‘good gover-
nance’ laws.
The repressive laws introduced — and 
propaganda distributed via a controlled 
media — particularly since April 2009, have 
had the effect of stifling criticism and convey-
ing the impression that the regime enjoys 
significant grassroots support. At the same 
time, decrees protecting the regime from 
prosecution, and a strategy of keeping the 
military loyal and strong through rewarding 
loyal officers with good positions, sidelin-
ing or removing from office those posing a 
threat, and ensuring a healthy budget for the 
disciplinary services has further entrenched 
Bainimarama’s position. And, of late, the 
apparent acceptance of the regime by those 
indigenous communities who have benefit-
ed from infrastructure projects, may add to 
Bainimarama’s sense of, or actual, security.
The ‘short periods of military rule followed 
by the consolidation of power by a single 
officer and the political marginalisation of 
much of the rest of the officer corps’, seen 
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by Geddes as a characteristic of a personal-
ist regime, usefully describes the situation in 
post 2006 coup Fiji, in which the officers of 
the early established military council were 
given prominent government roles immedi-
ately following the coup, but, in later years, 
were moved, sidelined or reshuffled, until 
only Bainimarama remained as a key leader 
without any apparent military successor.
The repressive laws have, so far, suc-
ceeded in stifling the free will of the people. 
However, having studied 163 authoritarian 
regimes, Geddes notes that, ‘All kinds of 
authoritarian regimes were eventually affect-
ed by the economic crisis, as populations 
plunging into poverty blamed their govern-
ments and gradually took the risk of demand-
ing change’ (Geddes 1999:138).
Five years after the Bainimarama-led 
coup, despite government claims to the 
contrary, and despite winning over some 
indigenous communities with the provision of 
relatively small local infrastructure projects, 
the economy of Fiji has worsened. Recent 
court cases on ‘seditious comments’ sprayed 
on billboards in the Suva-Nausori corridor, 
and prominent trade union leader Daniel Urai 
being charged with urging political violence 
suggest that repression is not working, and 
that Bainimarama remains afraid of people 
in Fiji who do not support the activities of the 
government. Earlier this year, major donors 
refused to release aid to Fiji unless genuine 
steps are taken towards free elections. 
This resulted in the regime making public 
reassurances that elections will happen in 
2014, and consultations for a new constitution 
will begin by September 2012. The lifting of 
the PER in January 2012 still left intact 
repressive laws including those curtailing the 
powers of the judiciary and the media.
The Bainimarama regime clearly does 
not want any uprising against its rule and, 
in fact, is fearful of any such action by the 
citizens of Fiji. There remains hope in Fiji that 
good sense will prevail and that democratic 
elections will be permitted soon, because a 
failure to return to democracy may result in 
the worsening economic situation driving the 
silent majority to join the smaller group of crit-
ics to agitate for self-government. 
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ENdNOTES
1. The Bainimarama administration has been 
known as Fiji’s ‘Interim Government’ or 
‘Caretaker Government’ since 5 December 
2006, due to its unelected status. Since 
10 April 2009, when it was re-sworn-in, it 
has generally been accepted locally and 
internationally that the regime will stay in 
power for many years. Furthermore, due 
to censorship after 10 April 2009, the local 
media became obliged to refer to the regime 
as the ‘Fiji government’. Thus, in this paper, 
the government prior to 10 April 2009 is 
referred to as the ‘Interim Government’ and 
the one appointed after 10 April 2009 is 
referred to as the government.
2. The author was employed at CCF between 
January 2007 and February 2011 and 
witnessed these events.
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